Node discovery in a networked organization by Maeno, Yoshiharu
ar
X
iv
:0
80
3.
33
63
v2
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 26
 Ju
n 2
00
9
Node discovery in a networked organization
Yoshiharu Maeno
Social Design Group
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-0011, Japan.
maeno.yoshiharu@socialdesigngroup.com
Abstract—In this paper, I present a method to solve a node
discovery problem in a networked organization. Covert nodes
refer to the nodes which are not observable directly. They affect
social interactions, but do not appear in the surveillance logs
which record the participants of the social interactions. Discov-
ering the covert nodes is defined as identifying the suspicious
logs where the covert nodes would appear if the covert nodes
became overt. A mathematical model is developed for the maximal
likelihood estimation of the network behind the social interactions
and for the identification of the suspicious logs. Precision, recall,
and F measure characteristics are demonstrated with the dataset
generated from a real organization and the computationally
synthesized datasets. The performance is close to the theoretical
limit for any covert nodes in the networks of any topologies and
sizes if the ratio of the number of observation to the number of
possible communication patterns is large.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, Covert node, Maximal like-
lihood estimation, Node discovery, Social network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Covert nodes in a networked organization refer to persons
who affect social interactions (communications among the
nodes and resulting collaborative activities), but do not appear
in the surveillance logs which record the participants of the
social interactions. They are not observable directly. Discov-
ering the covert nodes is defined as identifying the suspicious
surveillance logs where the covert nodes would appear if the
covert nodes became overt. This problem is called a node
discovery problem.
Where do we encounter such a problem? Globally net-
worked clandestine organizations such as terrorists, criminals,
or drug smugglers are great threat to the civilized societies.
Terrorism attacks cause great economic, social and environ-
mental damage. Active non-routine responses to the attacks are
necessary as well as the damage recovery management. The
short-term target of the responses is the arrest of the perpetra-
tors. The long-term target of the responses is identifying and
dismantling the covert organizational foundation which raises,
encourages, and helps the perpetrators. The threat will be miti-
gated and eliminated by discovering covert leaders and critical
conspirators of the clandestine organizations. The difficulty of
such discovery lies in the limited capability of surveillance.
Information on the leaders and critical conspirators are missing
because it is usually hidden by the organization intentionally.
In this paper, I present a method to solve the node dis-
covery problem. The method infers the network topology and
probability parameters behind the social interactions (by use
of the maximal likelihood estimation), applies an anomaly
detection technique to the surveillance logs, and identifies
the suspicious surveillance logs. III presents the method. IV
introduces the dataset generated from a real organization
and the computationally synthesized datasets for performance
tests. V demonstrates the precision, recall, and F measure
characteristics with the datasets.
II. RELATED WORK
The social network analysis is a study of social structures
made of nodes which are linked by one or more specific types
of relationship. Examples of the relationship are influence
transmission in communication, or presence of trust in col-
laboration. Studies in complex networks [3], [24], [6], WWW
search and analysis [4], [1], and machine learning of latent
variables [21], [22] are major related research topics.
Research interests have been moving from describing orga-
nizational nature to discovering unknown phenomena. A link
discovery predicts the existence of an unknown link between
two nodes from the information on the known attributes of the
nodes and the known links [5], [7], [23]. The link discovery
techniques are combined with domain-specific heuristics. The
collaboration between scientists can be predicted from the
published co-authorship [12]. The friendship between people is
inferred from the information available on their web pages [2].
Discovery of a network structure [18], [16], [17] and detection
of an anomaly in a network [20] are also relevant related
research topics.
A node discovery predicts the existence of an unknown
node around the known nodes from the information on the
collective behavior of the network. Related works in the node
discovery is limited. Heuristic method for node discovery is
proposed in [13]. The method applies clustering algorithm
[25], [8] to the nodes in a network, and detects the node which
inter-connects clusters at the border of a cluster in clustered
networks. The method is applied to analyze the covert social
network foundation behind the terrorism disasters [14].
III. METHOD
A. Observation
A node and a link in a social network are a person
and a relationship resulting in influence transmission between
persons. The symbols nj (j = 0, 1, · · · ) represent the nodes.
Some nodes are overt (observable), but the others are covert
(unobservable). O denote a set of the whole overt nodes
{n0, n1, · · · , nN−1}. Its cardinality is N = |O|. C = O
denotes a set of the whole covert nodes {nN , nN+1, · · · }. The
symbol δi (0 ≤ i < D) represent an individual communication
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pattern (and a resulting collaborative activity) among the
persons. It is a set of nodes, δi ∈ O ∩C . The unobservability
of the covert nodes does not affect the communication pattern.
For example, the members of a communication pattern are
those who join an online community.
An observation di in surveillance logs is a set of the overt
nodes in a communication pattern δi. It is given by eq.(1). The
number of data is D.
di = δi ∩O (0 ≤ i < D). (1)
{di} denotes the observation dataset. Note that neither an
individual node nor a single link can be observed directly, but
a group of nodes can be observed as a communication pattern.
{di} can be expressed by a 2-dimensional D × N matrix of
binary variables d. The presence or absence of the node nj in
the data di is indicated by the elements in eq.(2).
dij =
{
1 if nj ∈ di
0 otherwise (0 ≤ i < D, 0 ≤ j < N). (2)
B. Maximal Likelihood Estimator Network
A parametric form is defined to describe the network
topology and the influence transmission over the network. The
influence transmission governs the possible communication
patterns {δi} which result in the observation dataset {di}. The
probability where the influence transmits from an initiating
node nj to a responder node nk is rjk . The influence transmits
to multiple responders independently in parallel. It is similar
to the degree of collaboration probability in trust modeling
[11]. The constraints are 0 ≤ rjk and
∑
k 6=j rjk ≤ 1. The
quantity fj is the probability where the node nj becomes an
initiator. The constraints are 0 ≤ fj and
∑N−1
j=0 fj = 1. These
parameters are defined for the whole nodes in a social network
(both the nodes in O and C).
A single symbol θ represent both of the parameters rjk
and fj for the nodes in O. θ is the target variable, the
value of which needs to be inferred from the observation
dataset. The logarithmic likelihood function [8] is defined by
eq.(3). The quantity p({di}|θ) denote the probability where
the observation dataset {di} realizes under a given θ.
L(θ) = log(p({di}|θ)). (3)
The individual observations are assumed to be independent.
eq.(3) becomes eq.(4).
L(θ) = log(
D−1∏
i=0
p(di|θ)) =
D−1∑
i=0
log(p(di|θ)). (4)
The quantity qi|jk in eq.(5) is the probability where the
presence or absence of the node nk as a responder to the
stimulating node nj coincides with the observation di.
qi|jk =
{
rjk if dik = 1 for given i and j
1− rjk otherwise
. (5)
eq.(5) is equivalent to eq.(6) since the value of dik is either
0 or 1.
qi|jk = dikrjk + (1− dik)(1 − rjk). (6)
The probability p({di}|θ) in eq.(4) is expressed by eq.(7).
The operator ∧ means logical AND.
p(di|θ) =
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
∏
0≤k<N ∧ k 6=j
qi|jk. (7)
The logarithmic likelihood function takes an explicit for-
mula in eq.(8). The case k = j in multiplication (∏k) is
included since d2ik = dik always holds.
L(θ) =
D−1∑
i=0
log(
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}).
(8)
The maximal likelihood estimator θˆ is obtained by solving
eq.(9).
θˆ = argmax
θ
L(θ). (9)
A simple incremental optimization technique (hill climbing
method) is employed to solve eq.(9). Simulated annealing
method [8] can be employed to strengthen the search ability
and to avoid sub-optimal solutions. These methods search more
optimal parameter values around the present values and update
them as in eq.(10) until the values converge.{
rjk → rjk +∆rjk
fj → fj +∆fj
(0 ≤ j, k < N). (10)
The update ∆rnm and ∆fn should be in the direction of the
maximal ascend of the likelihood function. It is indicated by
the multiplication of the derivatives and the updates in eq.(11).
∆L(θ) =
N−1∑
n,m=0
∂L(θ)
∂rnm
∆rnm +
N−1∑
n=0
∂L(θ)
∂fn
∆fn. (11)
Individual derivatives in eq.(11) are calculated by eq.(12),
and eq.(13).
∂L(θ)
∂rnm
=
D−1∑
i=0
[fndin(2dim − 1)
∏
k 6=m
{1− dik + (2dik
−1)rnk} ÷
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}]. (12)
∂L(θ)
∂fn
=
D−1∑
i=0
[din
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rnk}
÷
N−1∑
j=0
dijfj
N−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}]. (13)
C. Node Discovery - Anomaly Detection
Suspiciousness of the observation data di is evaluated by
eq.(14). Suspiciousness means the likeliness where the covert
node would appear in the data if it became overt. Larger value
means more suspicious data.
s(di) =
1
p(di|θˆ)
. (14)
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Fig. 1. Network model (A) representing global mujahedin (Jihad fighters)
organization [19]. The model consists of 107 nodes, and 4 regional sub-
networks. The sub-networks represent Central Staffs (CS), Core Arabs (CA),
Maghreb Arabs (MA), and Southeast Asians (SA). The node nCS10, which
is indicated by a red circle, is believed to be the founder of the organization.
Ranking of the observation data can be calculated from the
value of eq.(14). The i-th most suspicious data is given by dσ(i)
in eq.(15). Suspiciousness s(dσ(i)) is larger than s(dσ(i′)) for
any i < i′.
σ(i) = arg max
m 6=σ(n) for ∀n<i
s(dm) (1 ≤ i ≤ D). (15)
IV. TEST DATASET
A. Network Model
Two classes of network models are employed to generate
communication test dataset. The first class is a real organiza-
tion. The second class is a mathematical model having several
adjustable parameters.
The network model (A) in Fig.1 represents a real orga-
nization. It is a global mujahedin (Jihad fighters) organi-
zation which was analyzed in [19]. The model consists of
107 persons and 4 regional sub-networks. The sub-networks
represent Central Staffs (CS), Core Arabs (CA) from the
Arabian Peninsula countries and Egypt, Maghreb Arabs (MA)
from the North African countries, and Southeast Asians (SA).
The organization has a relatively large Gini coefficient of the
nodal degree, 0.35, and a relatively large average clustering
coefficient, 0.54, [24]. In economics, the Gini coefficient is
a measure of inequality of income distribution or of wealth
distribution. A larger Gini coefficient indicates lower equality.
The values mean that the organization possesses hubs and a
group structure.
The node nCS10 (indicated by a red circle in Fig.1) is a
hub having relatively large nodal degree (K(nCS10) = 8). It
is believed to be the founder of the organization, and said to
be the covert leader who provides operational commanders in
regional sub-networks with financial support in many terrorism
attacks including 9/11 in 2001. His whereabouts are not known
despite many efforts in investigation and capture.
Fig. 2. Network model (C) consisting of 201 nodes and G = 8 groups.
The group contrast parameter in eq.(16) is η(G − 1) = 400. The node n1,
which is indicated by a red circle, is the largest hub whose nodal degree is
K(n1) = 23.
The model (A) provides with the practical implication
of solving the node discovery problem. But mathematical
model is more suitable than the real organization to study
the extensive quantitative characteristics of the method. Here,
Baraba´si-Albert model [3] with a group structure is used as a
generalization of hubs and group structure in the model (A).
The Baraba´si-Albert model grows with preferential attachment.
The probability where a newly coming node nk connects a link
to an existing node nj is proportional to the nodal degree of nj
(p(k → j) ∝ K(nj)). The occurrence frequency of the nodal
degree tends to be scale-free (f(K) ∝ Ka). In the Baraba´si-
Albert model with a group structure, every node nj is assigned
a pre-determined group attribute c(nj) to which it belongs. The
number of groups is G. The probability p(k → j) is modified
to eq.(16). Group contrast parameter η is introduced. Links
between the groups appear less frequently as η increases. The
initial links between the groups are connected at random before
growth by preferential attachment starts.
p(k → j) ∝
{
η(G− 1)K(nj) if c(nj) = c(nk)
K(nj) otherwise
. (16)
The network models (B), (C), and (D) are examples where
the number of nodes is 201 and G = 1, 8, and 201. The model
(B) results in the conventional Baraba´si-Albert model. The
model (C) is shown in Fig.2. The model (D) results in Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi model [6] which is configured by random connection
between nodes.
B. Communication Model
The dataset for performance tests is generated from the
network models in IV-A in the 2 steps below.
In the first step, the communication patterns {δi} are
generated D times according to the influence transmission
under the true value of θ. A pattern includes both an initiator
node nj and multiple responder nodes nk. An example is δ0 =
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{nCS1, nCS2, nCS4, nCS5, nCS6, nCS7, nCS10, nCS11, nCS12}
for the model (A) in Fig.1.
In the second step, the observation dataset {di} is generated
by deleting the covert nodes in C from the patterns {δi}.
The example δ0 results in the observation d0 = δ0 ∩ C =
{nCS1, nCS2, nCS4, nCS5, nCS6, nCS7, nCS11, nCS12} if the ex-
perimental condition is that C = {nCS10}.
The covert node in C may appear multiple times in the
communication patterns {δi}. The number of the target obser-
vation data to identify is given by Dt =
∑D−1
i=0 B(di 6= δi).
The function B(s) returns 1 if the statement s is true and 0
otherwise. A few conditions are assumed in the performance
evaluation in V for simplicity. At first, the probability fj does
not depend on the nodes (fj = 1/|O∪C|). Second, the value of
the probability rij is either 0 or 1. The number of the possible
communication patterns is bounded (less than or equal to the
number of nodes N ). Finally, the influence transmission is bi-
directional (rjk = rkj ).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Performance Measure
Precision, recall, and F measure are used as a measure
of the performance. In information retrieval (such as search,
document classification, and query classification), the precision
p is used as evaluation criteria, which is the fraction of the
number of relevant data to the number of the all data retrieved
by search. The recall r is the fraction of the number of the
data retrieved by search to the number of the all relevant data.
The relevant data refers to the data where di 6= δi. They are
given by eq.(17) and eq.(18) They are functions of the number
of the retrieved data Dr. It can take the value from 1 to D.
The data is retrieved in the order of dσ(1), dσ(2), to dσ(Dr).
p(Dr) =
∑Dr
i=1 B(dσ(i) 6= δσ(i))
Dr
. (17)
r(Dr) =
∑Dr
i=1 B(dσ(i) 6= δσ(i))
Dt
. (18)
The F measure F is the harmonic mean of the precision
and recall [10]. It is given by eq.(19).
F (Dr) =
1
1
2 (
1
p(Dr)
+ 1
r(Dr)
)
=
2p(Dr)r(Dr)
p(Dr) + r(Dr)
. (19)
The precision, recall, and F measure range from 0 to 1. All
the measures take larger values as the performance of retrieval
becomes better.
B. Result
The results of the performance evaluation using the test
dataset in IV-B derived from the network models in IV-A are
demonstrated.
Let’s start with the first class of the network models (real
organization) and learn the implication of the method. Fig.3
shows the precision (p), recall (r), and F measure (F ) in
the trial where the experimental condition is that the node
nCS10 in the model (A) is the target covert node to discover
(C = {nCS10}, |C| = 1, N = |O| = 106). The horizontal
axis is the rate of the number of the retrieved data (Dr) to
the number of the whole data (D). The vertical solid line
indicates the position at Dr = Dt. The broken lines indicate
the theoretical limit (upper bound) and the random retrieval
limit (lower bound). The evaluation is under the condition
where the all possible communication patterns are known.
The precision, recall, and F measure are the same value of
0.78 at Dr = Dt. These are much better than those of the
random retrieval (F (Dt) = 0.04) and close to the theoretical
limit. The method fails to discover two suspicious records
δi ={nCS10, nCS11}, and {nCS10, nCS12} when Dr is small.
This indicates that the communication with the nodes having
small nodal degree (K(nCS11) = 1 and K(nCS12) = 1)
does not provide much clues for node discovery. On the other
hand, the most suspicious observation data dσ(1) includes all
the neighbor nodes nCS1, nCS2, nCS4, nCS5, nCS6, nCS7,
nCS11, and nCS12. The method succeeded in discovering most
of the suspicious records and the all suspicious nodes. The
investigators will decide to collect more detailed information
on the communication (and a resulting collaborative activ-
ity) of the suspicious neighbor nodes. This will result in
identifying, locating, and finally, capturing the covert leader
(C = {nCS10}) who is responsible for many terrorism attacks.
Let’s move on to the second class of the network model
(mathematical model with adjustable parameters) and study
the extensive performance characteristics of the method. Fig.4
shows the F measure F (Dt) as a function of the nodal degree
K . Individual plots shows the F measure averaged over the
trials where the experimental condition is that a node having
a given nodal degree K(ni) = K is the target covert node
to discover (N = |O| = 200, |C| = 1). The solid line
graphs (a), (b), and (c) are for the model (B), (C), and (D).
The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random
retrieval limit. The evaluation is under the condition where
the all possible communication patterns are known in Fig.4
through Fig.6. The resulting F measure ranges from 0.7 to 1.
It does not depend on the number of groups (or topology of
the network model). The performance becomes better as the
nodal degree of the target covert nodes increases.
Fig.5 shows the F measure F (Dt) as a function of the
number of groups G in the trial where the largest hub is the
target covert node to discover (N = |O| = 200, |C| = 1). The
horizontal axis is G/N . The number of the nodes is constant.
The group contrast parameter is fixed at η(G − 1) = 400
regardless of the value of G. The broken lines indicate the
theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit. The F measure
degrades down to 0.7 around G = 0.5N . But the performance
still remains much better than that of the random retrieval. The
method can be applied for any value of G.
Fig.6 shows the F measure F (Dt) as a function of the
number of overt nodes (N = |O|) in the trial where the
largest hub is the target covert node to discover (|C| = 1).
The number of the groups is constant (G = 1). The broken
lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval
limit. Except the case N = 50, the performance remains
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Fig. 3. Precision (p), recall (r), and F measure (F ) in the trial where the
node nCS10 in the model (A) is the target covert node to discover (C =
{nCS10}, |C| = 1, N = |O| = 106). The horizontal axis is the rate of
the number of the retrieved data (Dr) to the number of the whole data (D).
The vertical solid line indicates the position at Dr = Dt. The broken lines
indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit.
Fig. 4. F measure F (Dt) as a function of the nodal degree K . Individual
plots shows the F measure averaged over the trials where a node having a given
nodal degree K(ni) = K is the target covert node to discover (|C| = 1).
The solid line graphs (a), (b), and (c) are for the model (B), (C), and (D)
(|O| = 200). The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random
retrieval limit.
Fig. 5. F measure F (Dt) as a function of the number of groups G in the
trial where the largest hub is the target covert node to discover. The number
of the nodes is constant (|O| = 200, |C| = 1). The group contrast parameter
is η(G − 1) = 400. The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the
random retrieval limit.
Fig. 6. F measure F (Dt) as a function of the number of nodes N = |O| in
the trial where the largest hub is the target covert node to discover (|C| = 1).
The number of the groups is constant (G = 1). The broken lines indicate the
theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit.
constant. The method can be applied for large networks. Note
that several hours of calculation is necessary with a standard
personal computer when N approaches to 1000. The size of
the network is limited by the amount of calculation rather than
by the accuracy obtainable from the method.
Fig.7 shows the F measure F (Dt) as a function of the
number of the observed data D in the trial where the node n0 in
the model (B) is the target covert node to discover (C = {n0}).
The horizontal axis is the ratio of D to the number of the
possible communication patterns (|O∪C| = N+1) as assumed
in IV-B. The ratio was D/N = 1 in Fig.4 through Fig.6.
The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random
retrieval limit. The F measure is close to the theoretical limit,
if more than 80% of the possible communication patterns is
observed. The performance is no better than that of the random
retrieval if only 50% of the possible communication patterns
is observed. It is a major restriction imposed on the method
that many of the possible communication patterns need to be
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Fig. 7. F measure F (Dt) as a function of the number of the observed data
D in the trial where the node n0 in the model (B) is the target covert node to
discover. The horizontal axis is D/N . The broken lines indicate the theoretical
limit and the random retrieval limit.
known. Overcoming the restriction is for future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I define a node discovery problem in a
networked organization and present a method to solve the
problem. The method infers the network behind the social
interactions, applies an anomaly detection technique to the
surveillance logs, and identifies the suspicious surveillance
logs. The precision, recall, and F measure characteristics are
close to the theoretical limit for any covert nodes in the
networks of any topologies and sizes. I believe that, in the
investigation of a clandestine organization [14], the method
aids the investigators in identifying the close associates (par-
ticipants in the most suspicious surveillance record) of a covert
leader or a critical conspirator.
I plan to address 3 issues for the future works. The first issue
is to overcome the restriction where the performance degrades
unless the ratio of the number of the observation to the number
of possible communication patterns is large. The second issue
is to extend the models for the social interactions. The model
in this paper represents the radial influence transmission from
an initiating node toward multiple responder nodes. In real
networked organizations, other types of influence transmission
are present such as serial (chain-shaped) influence transmis-
sion, or tree-like influence transmission. The third issue is to
develop a method to solve the variants of the node discovery
problem. Discovering fake nodes, or spoofing nodes are also
interesting problems to uncover the malicious intentions of the
organization. A fake node is the person who does not exist in
the organization, but appears in the surveillance. A spoofing
node is the person who belong to an organization, but appears
as a different node in the surveillance.
We encounter the node discovery problem in many areas of
business and social sciences [15]. For example, in document
analysis [23], something unknown, which is not stated explic-
itly, can be discovered. The discovery may provide the analyst
with a clue to approach the hidden intention of the author, an
opinion which is about to emerge, or a sign of trends. The
method will be the new basis to analyze something hidden
behind the direct observation, which is beyond the scope of the
conventional statistical methods and data mining expertises.
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